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HERBERT SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY.
BY DR. LEWIS G. JANES.
While the article of Dr. Carus on " Spencerian
Agnosticism," in The Open Court of September 17th,
is of interest as clearing up some possible misunder-
standings of his own position, on the main point at
issue between objective monism and that form of ag-
nosticism which appears to its advocates to be the
only logical outcome of modern philosophical thought,
Dr. Carus's statement seems to be an explanation
which does not explain.
While I have no desire to prolong the controversy,
or to weary the readers of The Open Court by the re-
iteration of the positions taken in my former article, a
clear understanding of the question at issue, and jus-
tice to Mr. Spencer, seem to require a brief reply to
Dr. Carus As to Mr. Spencer's position, I prefer to
permit him to speak in his own language, in passages
selected from his published works. By reference to
such passages as most clearly represent his agnostic
attitude and his anti-materialistic philosophy, I hope
to show that his position does not essentially differ
from my own as set forth in the article on "Philo-
sophical Agnosticism and Monism"; that his agnosti-
cism is a natural and logical deduction from the dic-
tum of modern psychology respecting the nature of
our knowledge, and that his anti-materialistic position
is clearly defined and logically maintained. First,
however, permit me a brief word in reply to Dr.
Carus's comments on my previous article.
Commencing with the confession that he does not
know what I mean by the innermost, intrinsic and es-
sential nature of reality, he proceeds to affirm what I
have never denied—that "the representation of real-
ity in thought-symbols /.f knowledge." Undoubtedly
it is knowledge ; but of what? Of the thought- sym-
bols, of course ; this, and nothing more. And these
thought-symbols by Dr. Carus's own clear definition,
quoted in my previous article, are ' ' mere abstractions "
to look upon which as realities "is a self-mystifica-
tion." When he affirms in the note, (p. 2948) that
"mental as well as material processes, in my opinion
are realities," I confess to a mystification on my part
which is in no degree enlightened by the additional
explanation that "they are no realities if considered
by themselves as abstract ideas." Consider them how
you will, as "processes" or as "abstract ideas," they
are disparate and dual. If "mental and material pro-
cesses are realities" then reality is not one but dual.
This assertion of Dr. Carus's is the logical negation of
Monism.
But perhaps my critic meant to assert, not that
^'mental and material processes are realities," but that
the actual process which appears in our consciousness
on the one hand as mental and on the other as mate-
rial, under the necessary interpretation of our thought-
symbols, is a reality. If so, my question is again to
the point : What is the nature of this process, regarded
as monistic, apart from its symbolical mental and ma-
terial interpretations?
In further confirmation of the agnostic position,
asserted by myself, moreover, Dr. Carus finally con-
fesses, (p. 2955): "The term 'reality' means nothing
but actual being and cannot give us any information
about the innermost nature of being." This is precisely
what the agnostic claims. The "particular qualities
of reality," i. e. its modes of affecting our finite con-
sciousness, can be definitely described and defined.
Its innermost nature, however, is incapable of defini-
tion. The fact that the objective monist "can see no
use" in forming a concept of "the innermost, essen-
tial and intrinsic nature of reality as a whole " does not
imply that Reality possesses no intrinsic character
apart from its modes of affecting our consciousness ;
it implies rather that the mind of the objective monist
ceases to think just as this particular phase of the prob-
lem comes in view, and that his agnosticism is there-
fore implicit merely, though no less actual ; while that
of the Spencerian is clearly thought out, explicit and
frankly confessed. The realms of admitted knowability
of the Monist and the Spencerian are identical and co-
extensive. No possibility of thought and investigation
which is open to the former is closed to the latter.
The Spencerian, however, perceives that parallel and
co-ordinate with the infinite realm of relative knowl-
edge which symbolically interprets the effects of Reality
in dual and disparate terms of mental and material pro-
cesses to our finite consciousness, lies an infinite realm
of Reality in its essential, intrinsic constitution, which
the finite mind can never penetrate. Yet there are
not two infinites, but one and the same infinite Real-
ity. The idea of modes of existence which are "ab-
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solutely unknowable " to the finite mind is, therefore,
not abandoned by the disclaimer that agnosticism im-
plies the assertion of the unknowability of reality /cr
sc. If the perception of this truth is indeed a "bot-
tomless abyss," as Dr. Carus declares, which "im-
pels man to stop thinking," the only difference be-
tween the objective Monist and the Spencerian agnos-
tic is that the former stops thinking before he reaches
the edge of the abyss, and plunges blindly in, while
the agnostic clearly sees it before him, and dechnesto
attempt the hopeless task of fathoming its unsearch-
able depths. That the agnostic conception implies a
profound mystery at the heart of Being I have no-
where denied. With Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske I
confess -that I can see no complete solution of this
mystery while finite consciousness endures. "What I
did affirm and hereby reaffirm is that the doctrine of
the Unknowable does not rest upon any "mystery"
—
any supernaturalist or metaphysical basis, for its ex-
planation,—but is a logical deduction from the sim-
plest demonstrated facts of psychological science.
This doctrine as asserted by Mr. Spencer rests
primarily upon "the antithesis of subject and object,
never to be transcended while consciousness lasts."*
Precisely here I have rested it in my own argument.
In "First Principles," additional arguments, based on
the well-sustained claim that this is "the deepest, wid-
est, and most certain of all facts,"—a fact in which
science unites with philosophy and religion in recog-
nising,—and supported by the considerations deduced
by Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel from the
nature of mind and consciousness, are brought for-
ward in its support. Finally, from the nature of Life
itself as the continued adjustment of inner-relations to
outer relations, the necessary relativity of our knowl-
edge is argued, and the actuality and reality of the
Unknowable is maintained against those writers who
claim that the words "Infinite" and "Absolute" ex-
press merely negative ideas. But it is in the "Prin-
ciples of Psychology," where the nature of mind and
knowledge is expressly treated, that the clearest state-
ments of the fundamental principles of Spencerian ag-
nosticism are to be found.
In the section entitled "The Physical Synthesis,"
(Principles of Psychology, Vol. i, pp. 616-627.) Mr.
Spencer fairly states the position of the Materialist,
the Spiritualist, and of that yet more refined school of
thought which makes Motion the supreme reality un-
derlying all mental activities, and shows why neither
of these views is illustrative of his own philosophical
position. The passage continues (§ 272):
"Comparatively consistent as is this answer, and serving
though it does to throw back with added force the reproaches of
the spiritualist, it is not the answer to be here given. In the clos-
* "Principles of Psychology," Vol. i. p. 62. (English Edition.)
ing paragraphs of ' First Principles,' and again in the earlier parts
of the present work, the position was taken, that the truth is not
expressible either by materialism or by spiritualism, however
modified and however refined. Let me now, for the last time, set
forth the ultimate implications of the argument running through
this volume as well as through preceding volumes.
" Carried to whatever extent, the inquiries of the psychologist
do not reveal the ultimate nature of mind ; any more than do the
inquiries of the chemist reveal the ultimate nature of matter, or
those of the physicist the ultimate nature of motion. Though the
chemist is gravitating towards the belief that there is a primitive
atom, out of which by variously-arranged unions are formed the so-
called elements, as out of these by variously-arranged unions are
formed oxides, acids, and salts, and the multitudinous more com-
plex substances
;
yet he knows no more than he did at first about
this hypothetical primitive atom. And similarly, though we have
seen reason for thinking that there is a primitive unit of conscious-
ness, that sensations of all orders are formed of such units com-
bined in various relations, that by the compounding of these sen-
sations and their various relations are produced perceptions and
ideas and so on up to the highest thoughts aiid emotions
;
yet this
unit of consciousness remains inscrutable. Suppose it to have be-
come quite clear that a shock in consciousness and a molecular
motion, are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing
;
we continue utterly incapable .6f uniting the two, so as to cojiceive
that reality of w/iicJi they are the opposite faces.* Let us consider
how either face is framed in our thoughts.
" The conception of a rhythmically moving mass of sensible
matter is a synthesis of certain states of consciousness that stand
related in a certain succession. The conception of a rhythmically
moving molecule, is one in which these states and their relations
have been reduced to the extremest limits of dimension represent-
able to the mind, and are then assumed to be further reduced far
beyond the limits of representation. So that this rhythmically
moving molecule, which is our unit of composition of external
phenomena, is mental in a three-fold sense—our experiences of a
rhythmically moving mass, whence the conception of it is derived,
are states of mind, having objective counterparts that are un-
known ; the derived conception of a rhythmically moving molecule,
is formed of states of mind that have no directly-presented objec-
tive counterparts at all ; and when we try to think of the rhythm-
ically moving molecule as we suppose it to exist, we do so by
imagining that we have re-represented these representative states,
on an infinitely reduced scale. So that the unit out of which we
build our interpretation of material phenomena, is triply ideal.
"On the other hand, what do we think of this ideal unit, con-
sidered as a portion of mind ? It arises, as we have seen, by syn-
thesis of many feelings, real and ideal, and of the many changes
among them. What are feelings ? What is changed ? And what
changes it ? If to avoid obvious implications of materiality, we
call each element of this ideal unit, a state of consciousness, we
only get into similar implications. The conception of a state of
consciousness implies the conception of an existence which has the
state. When in decomposing certain of our feelings we find them
formed of minute shocks, ( succeeding one another with different
rapidities and in different combinations ; and when we conclude
that all our feelings are probably formed of such units of con-
sciousness variously combined, we are still obliged to conceive of
this unit of consciousness as a change wrought by some force in
something. No effort of the imagination enables us to think of a
shock, however minute, except as undergone by an entity. We are
compelled, therefore, to postulate a substance of mind that is af-
fected, before we can think of its affections. But we can form no
* See my simila
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notion of a substance oi mind absolutely divested of attributes
connoted by the word substance ; and all such attributes are ab-
stracted from our experiences of material phenomena. Expel from
the conception of mind every one of those attributes by which we
distinguish an external something from an external nothing, and
the conception of mind becomes nothing. If to escape this diffi-
culty we repudiate the expression ' state of consciousness ' and call
each undecomposable feeling ' a consciousness,' we merely get out
of one difficulty into another. A consciousness if not the state of
a thing is itself a thing. And as many different consciousnesses
as there are, so many different things there are. How shall we
think of these so many independent things, having their differen-
tial characters, when we have excluded all conceptions derived
from external phenomena ? We can think of entities which differ
from one another and from nonentity, only by bringing into our
thoughts the remembrances of entities which we distinguished as
objective and material. Again, how are we to conceive these con-
sciousnesses as either being changed one into another or as being
replaced one by another ? We cannot do this without conceiving
of cause ; and we know nothing of cause save as manifested in ex-
istences we class as material—either our own bodies or surround-
ing things.
" See then our predicament. We can think of matter only in
terms of mind. We can think of mind only in terms of matter.
When we have pushed our e.xplorations of the first to the utter-
most limit, we are referred to the second for a final answer ; and
when we have got the final answer of the second we are referred
back to the first for an interpretation of it. We find the value of
-r in terms of y; then we find the value of y in terms of x; and
so on we may continue forever without coming nearer to a solu-
tion. The antithesis of subject and object, never to be trnns:ei:ded
while consciousness lasts, renders impossible all hwivledje of that
Ultimate Reality in which subject and olject are united.
" And this brings us to the true conclusion implied through-
out the foregoing pages,—the conclusion that it is one and the same
Ultimate Reality which is manifested to us subjectively and objec-
tively. For while the nature of that which is manifested under
either form proves to be inscrutable, the order of its manifesta-
tions throughout all mental phenomena proves to be the same as
the order of its manifestations throughout all material phenomena."
This somewhat lengthy passage, I think, shows
clearly, (i) the irrefragable psychological foundation
of philosophical agnosticism in the antithesis of sub-
ject and object, "never to be transcended while con-
sciousness lasts"
; (2) the anti-materialistic character
of Mr. Spencer's psychology ; and (3) the monistic
foundation on which his entire philosophy is based :
"it is one and the same Ultimate Reality which is
manifested to us subjectively and objectively."
Those critics who persist in asserting that Mr.
Spencer's philosoph}' is materialistic in its implications
constantly ignore the fact that he everywhere affirms
that the reality underlying what we conceive as matter
and motion can by no means be identical with matter
and motion, but must be something essentially differ-
ent. Importing into their own and his thought the
ordinary conceptions of matter and motion, they find
no difficulty in showing how absurd is the incongruity
when consciousness is supposed to emerge from them.
If they would keep constantly in view the fact that
Mr. Spencer regards the Ultimate Reality as one ; as
something entirely different from matter and motion
as we conceive them ; as so much higher in its nature
than even the highest manifestations of human con-
sciousness that it transcends consciousness "as much
as consciousness transcends a plant's functions," then
they would perceive how futile and unfair is an argu-
ment based upon the ordinary materialistic concep-
tions of matter and motion. To no careful and sym-
pathetic student of Mr. Spencer, however, is such a
misapprehension possible.
THE CASE OF AGNOSTICISM REVISED.
We freely concur with Dr. Lewis G. Janes in the
main point on which he so vigorously insists, that Mr.
Herbert Spencer's philosophy is not "materialistic in
its implications," for undoubtedly it is agnostic. Ac-
cording to Mr. Spencer, the underlying reality is and
remains unknowable. Dr. Janes, however, goes too
far, when he characterises Mr. Spencer's philosophy as
anti-materialistic. His position is not anti-material-
istic, but non-materialistic. According to the agnostic
principles, we do not know anything about "the real-
ity underlying what we conceive as matter and mo-
tion," it might be spirit, it might be matter, it might
be anything natural, yet it might be something of
which we have no notion, it might be something that
is not found in the realm of nature, it might be super-
natural.
I. MR. ELLIS THURTELL'S AGNOSTICISM.
Dr. Janes is not satisfied with my explanation, be-
cause it does not explain the main point at issue be-
tween monism and agnosticism. But the trouble with
agnosticism is that it is a Proteus constantly changing
under our hands. Mr. Herbert Spencer's philosophy
admits of many interpretations. Whom have we to
accept as the orthodox Spencerian, Professor Fiske or
Mr. Ellis Thurtell? Mr. Ellis Thurtell comments in
The AgTiostic Journal, (xxix, 12) September 19, 1891,
upon the discussion of agnosticism which appeared in
The Open Court, No. 207, saying that he wants to know
Dr. Janes's own construction of "living in the spirit."
He says :
'
' It would be a most remarkable thing if so representative a
Spencerian as the President of the Brooklyn Ethical Association
seems to be, had any ardent yearnings toward the supernatural-
istic short-cut of theological lore. ..."
I do not see that Dr. Janes's and Professor Fiske's
position can be characterised as a yearning toward
supernaturalism or theology. Nevertheless, their in-
terpretation of Spencerianism differs widely from that
of Mr. Ellis Thurtell. The latter is by no means ready
to accept their view of Spencerianism. He says :
" Herbert Spencer is perpetually, throughout his various vol-
umes, impressing upon his many misunderstanding readers that
his implications are neither necessarilyMaterialistic nor necessarily
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Spiritualistic, and that the strife between Materialist and Spirit-
ualist is substantially a war of words. Quite unequivocal are his
continuous statements that it is immaterial in which of these two
terms of thought we choose to express our conceptions of mind and
matter ; that, in point of fact, the terms of both Materialistic and
Spiritualistic thought are merely symbols, such as those of algebra,
for the expression of what is, in the last resort, a reality unknown,
if not, indeed, unknowable as well. Herbert Spencer is most
evidently agnostic on this point. It is to his mind as much beyond
the present scope of human knowledge as is the question of the
ultimate causation of the universe itself.
'
' These clearly and strongly put views of our great philosopher
are to be found not only in an earlier edition of his works, but also
in the very latest, which, in its entirety, is now before me. This
fact, together with the equally indisputable one of Dr. Fiske hav-
ing built up a certain far from Agnostic theory called ' Cosmic
Theism,' may serve to cast some doubt upon the importance of
what Dr. Fiske himself is said to have revealed to the assembled
company on this eventful evening. The revelation was nothing
less than the assertion that Herbert Spencer had confessed, in
1874, to a change of opinion upon the ' Correlation of Forces'
question, and had acquiesced in the construction Dr. Fiske had
placed upon his philosophy as a whole. With every respect for
the author of ' Cosmic Philosophy,' it seems to me that, failing
any positive written statement from Herbert Spencer upon the
precise point at issue, we should all do well to content ourselves
with the exposition of his views, so lucidly and (as I think) so con-
sistently set forth in the fifth edition of ' First Principles,' and in
the third edition of ' Principles of Psychology," both published
during last year. Upon the authority of these volumes, I submit
that both Dr. Janes and Dr. Fiske have, in some measure, mis-
represented the matured views of our great philosopher of Agnos-
ticism and Evolution, and that Herbert Spencer has neither
changed the base of his philosophy, by putting into the background
the principle of 'Persistence of Force,' nor has repudiated, with
his latest breath, any one of the assertions contained in the pas-
sages quoted by the Spiritualist from New York."
Before I proceed to discuss Dr. Janes's position
and the passage quoted by him from Mr. Spencer, I
have to make a few comments on Mr. Ellis Thurtell's
proposition. We maintain in opposition to Mr. Her-
bert Spencer's or anybody's agnosticism, that knowl-
edge means description in mental symbols and reality
can be described in mental symbols. Reality is not un-
knowable. And we maintain at the same time that
the different problems of causation are by no means be-
yond the present scope of human knowledge. Mr.
Thurtell speaks of "the question of the ultimate caus-
ation of the universe." Does that mean how the uni-
verse originated out of nothing? That question is
answered by the law of the conservation of matter and
energy. The universe did not originate out of noth-
ing ; it is eternal. The term "eternal" means that it
exists, that it has existed, and that it will exist ; it has
never been created out of nothing and can never dis-
appear into nothing.
By the bye, I cannot approve of such word-com-
binations as "ultimate causation." To speak of causa-
tion as "ultimate " implies at the start a lack of clear-
ness concerning the meaning of "cause" and must
necessarily impHcate us in inextricable contradictions.
The recent discussion of the Brooklyn Ethical As-
sociation grew hottest concerning the question: What
is the corner-stone of Mr. Spencer's philosophy, the
correlation of forces, or the doctrine of the relativity
of knowledge? Mr. Spencer has repeatedly spoken
of sensations, emotions, and thoughts as being trans-
formed motion
;
yet on other occasions he has also
expressed the view that mind and matter are opposite
faces of one and the same unknowable reality. Now
it was maintained by the disputants, that if these two
"faces" could not be transformed the one into the
other, Mr. Spencer would have to give up his doctrine
of the correlation of forces.
Let us stop here. The correlation of forces can-
not be given up either by Mr. Spencer or by any one.
The doctrine of the correlation of forces is not spe-
cifically Spencerian or agnostic, or positivistic, or
monistic. It is common property. No sound thinker
at the present age doubts that any one force is trans-
formable into another. What Mr. Spencer and with
him his followers, Professor Fiske included, will have
to give up, is simply the idea that psychic states are
shocks. Psychic states, i. e. feelings, are states of
awareness ; they are neither forces nor transformed
forces.
Says Leibnitz :
" We are constrained to confess that perception and whatever
depends upon it, are inexplainable upon mechanical principles
;
that is by reference to forms and movements. If we could imag-
ine a machine the operation of which would manufacture thoughts,
feelings, and perceptions, and could think of it as enlarged in all
its proportions, so that we could go into it as into a mill, even
then we would find in it nothing but particles jostling each other,
and never anything by which perception could be explained."
If we could go into the brain, we should see blood
rushing through nervous structures, we should see cer-
tain parts of the latter, receiving the blood, oxydise
and thus change its potential energy into kinetic
energy. Our cicerone, supposing we had some one who
knew all about it, might point out the different spots
where feelings are taking place, and yet we should see
no feelings. We should only see "particles jostling
each other." And why? Because feelings are not mo- •
tions. Feelings are not objective processes, they are
subjective processes, they are not visible, they are not
observable. They can only be felt, for they are states
of awareness.
How we think subject and object as one, has been
explained in other places and need not be discussed
here. (See "The Soul of Man" pp. 1-46.)
Sensations in one sense are transformed force. By
"sensation" we generally understand a physiological
process which in some part is accompanied with feel-
ing. The physiological process of a sensation is a
breaking down of nervous substance, it is the setting
free of a certain amount of potential energy. As such
THR OREN COURT. 2995
it is mechanical. But the feeling of the sensation is
not mechanical. A sensation in so far as we con-
sider it as a special kind of feeling, a feeling of sight,
or a sound, a taste or an odor is not transformed
force. By feeling we understand that state of aware-
ness which appears while a certain kind and amount
of nerve-substance is being disturbed through some
irritation. The physiological process is a shock ; the
psychical state is no shock, it is simply awareness.
Concerning the non-interconvertibility of feeling
and motion. Professor Fiske and Dr. Janes cannot be
said to have, as Mr. Thurtell declares, in some meas-
ure misrepresented Mr. Spencer's views ; they have
simply tried with a friendly hand to eliminate the
consequences of a mistake.
II. DR. LEWIS G. J.ANES'S AGNOSTICISM.
Dr. Lewis G. Janes's agnosticism is based upon
the idea that knowledge, being the representation of
reality in thought-symbols, is a knowledge of the
thought-symbols and nothing more. This is a funda-
mental error, that calls for explanation and refutation.
"Knowledge is the representation of reality in
thought-symbols" means that some process affects a
sentient being and causes a physiological disturbance
together with which a definite state of awareness
arises. There is a tree from which innumerable rays
of light proceed. The tree is different from the picture
on the retina, and again the picture on the retina (the
latter being to some extent a chemical process) is dif-
ferent from the disturbance caused in the cortical centre
of vision. This disturbance again considered purely as
a physiological process is different from the state of
awareness which accompanies the process. Yet all
these events preserve a certain something in their
forms which they have in common and so the feeling
element in the sensation of a tree comes to represent
the tree. The representative value of a feeling is
called its contents. Every kind of sense-impression is
followed by a special kind of feeling and thus the world
around us is mapped out in feelings. Ideas, abstract
thoughts, concepts are higher kinds of representative
feelings. They are symbols which represent whole
groups or generalisations i. e. composites of many
similar feelings.
Now we ask again with Dr. Janes, What is knowl-
edge ? We answer and so does he : Knowledge is the
representation of reality in thought-symbols. Dr. Janes
proceeds to ask, "Knowledge; but of what? Of the
thought-symbols, of course ; this and nothing more."
Here is a mistake. No man has a direct knowledge of
his thought-symbols as being thought-symbols. Every
state of awareness is an awareness of the contents of
that state ; and we assume that the contents of each
state of awareness depends upon the special form of
the action that takes place in some nerve-structure.
Popularly speaking, feeling beings are not aware of
their physiological brain activity, but of the purport
and meaning of their physiological brain activity alone.
No one seeing a tree and thinking of it is aware of or
has a knowledge of a thought symbol. Every one
seeing a tree and thinking of it, is aware of and knows
a certain contents of a thought-symbol of his which
we call a tree ; he is aware of the tree itself. That
the means through which a man knows a tree is the
symbolism of sensations and the activity of nervous
structures, re-constructing in some way the picture of
a tree in feeling substance, is not at all immediate
knowledge ; on the contrary, it is the result of most
difficult and subtle investigations.
Sensations and thought-symbols are realities just
as much as any other processes of nature ; and the ob-
jects represented in thought-symbols are, if true, also
realities. There are some thought-symbols which rep-
resent certain qualities or features abstracted in thought
from objects ; they are called abstracts. Such abstracts
are matter, motion, spirit, etc. The qualities repre-
sented in abstracts are real also. They exist in and
with things. But abstracts have not an existence by
themselves. There is no absolute motion and there
is no gravity outside of gravitating bodies. Indeed
all things, (ourselves included) are such as they are
only in connection with the whole universe. Every
single object is inseparable from the whole cosmos,
and if we speak of a thing we separate it in our thought
from the rest of the world. This separation however
is a fiction, which if persisted in, leads us to the ab-
surd idea of things in themselves.
The whole universe is a vast system of relations,
and these relations are reality itself. There is nothing
unconditioned, nothing unrelated, nothing absolute.
Everything real is, and necessarily must be, relative.
A correct description of the relations of reality in the
mind of a feeling being is knowledge. To say that
we can know the relative, but cannot know the abso-
lute or the unconditioned, is equivalent to saying that
ivc can know that which exists hut we can never know
that which does not exist.
That which is or can be represented in our mental
symbols, the contents of our sensations, i. e. of our
sense-symbols, being that with which we have to deal in
actual life, is generally called reality. Now we are told
that beside it there is another reality which cannot be
represented in mental symbols and which can neither
directly nor indirectly affect man's consciousness. The
former kind of reality is relative, the latter is absolute,
the former can be comprehended the latter is incom-
prehensible and unthinkable. The former is the pro-
vince of the sciences, commonly considered as nature,
the latter is the innermost nature of reality, which " in
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its essential, intrinsic constitution the finite* mind
can never penetrate,"— "while consciousness lasts."
We can understand reality as a whole, i. e. we can
systematise our knowledge of the former in a unitary
world-conception
;
yet we cannot understand the in-
nermost nature of being. Says Dr. Janes:
" The mind of the objective monist ceases to think just as this
particular phase of the problem comes in view and his agnosticism
is therefore implicite merely, though no less actual."
The objective monist ceases to think that which
according to the agnostic's statement is unthinkable
and incomprehensible. Suppose but for a moment
that this unthinkable kind of a reality did not exist
and imagine that the former kind of reality, that which
can be represented in sense-symbols and with which
we have to deal in actual life existed alone, should we
then not be able to have a clear monistic world con-
ception without the superimposed additions of agnos-
ticism ? Indeed we can do without the supposition of
a reality behind that which is usually called reality
;
and if we take our concepts of matter, motion, spirit,
feeling, thought, etc., as symbolising certain features
of nature, we need not furthermore ask for the inner-
most nature of reality as a whole.
Nature is nature; degrees of innermost- ness do
not exist in Nature. Says Goethe :
' Naiur hat zvedt'7
Atles ist sie iiiti t
n noch Schale,
• Male."
In a way similar to that of Dr. Janes on the innermost
nature, Mr. Spencer speaks of the ultimate nature of
things—of mind, of matter, of motion, etc. The ulti-
mate nature is always said to be unknowable. What can
the innermost or ultimate nature of a thing mean? It
can mean the essential quality of a thing or a process.
That however is not at all incapable of definition or
incomprehensible. So for instance the essential qual-
ity of mind is symbolism ; every mind is a system of
representative symbols in feeling substance. The in-
nermost and ultimate nature of something can also
mean its most general quality. Thus, for instance, what
is the most general quality of all matter? It is that
which all kinds of matter have in common. Matter is
that which directly or indirectly can affect any one of
the senses. In either sense the innermost and ultimate
natures of things are knowable. What other meaning
the phrase can have I know not and am unable to sur-
mise.
Parenthetically I may state that the terms "huite mind," "
ness," and also " infinite reality " are illegitimate word-comt
The Open Court, No. Z15, p. 2979.) Realities are always definii
The infinite and infinitude are not objects, but unlimited,
to be finished processes or possibilities. Every atom is ir
spects. It has infinite possibilities of motion, of combinat
use such ptirases as infinite reality or finite minds, we b
volvtd in a confused conception of things. The terms " in
lute " are by no means "negative " ideas.
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III. MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S AGNOSTICISM.
Dr. Janes quotes a long passage from Mr. Spen-
cer's psychology which contains several strange mis-
statements and ends with the usual refrain of his ergo
igtiorahimus. Mr. Spencer artificially produces an in-
extricable confusion and concludes that all knowledge
is impossible. I cannot enter here in a discussion
concerning the possible meaning of " primitive atoms,"
or "primitive units of consciousness," or "the rhythm-
ically moving molecule which is our unit of composi-
tion of external phenomena." Still less can I discuss
Mr. Spencer's belief in " the substance of mind;" such
a thing as "a substance of mind " is a meaningless and
self-contradictory, a misleading, and therefore a dan-
gerous phrase. Nor do I intend to investigate the
old paralogism that "the conception of a state of
consciousness implies the conception of an existence
which has the state." This is the basis of the old ego-
psychology which has been refuted a century ago by
Hume, by Kant, and many others after Kant. I shall
limit myself to the main point at issue. Mr. Spencer
declares :
"We can think matter only in terms of mind and mind only
in terms of matter We find the value of x in terms of y ;
then we find the value of _)' in terms of x ; and so on we may con-
tinue forever without coming nearer to a solution. The antithesis
of subject and object, never to be transcended while consciousness lasts,
renders impossible all knowledge of thai Ultimate Reality in which
subject and object are united, '
'
There is some truth in the statement, that "we
can think matter only in terms of mind "; yet the word
"term" is incorrect. We do not think matter in
"terms" of mind, i. e. in expressions which denote
mind, which characterise mind. We think matter in
terms which characterise matter. We ought to say
"matter as we think it," the idea "matter" is a
mental symbol. This is a truism. Everything we
think, is thought only in so far as it is put in mental
symbols. This is true of matter and of motion, of
possible and impossible things, of mind itself and of
anything we can imagine, even that which for some
reason or other is said to be inconceivable or, in case
it contains self-contradictions, is actually inconceiv-
able.
There is some truth also in the statement that "we
can think mind only in terms of matter." Yet this
statement also wants a correction. We can think
mind only as being the mind of some real and mate-
rial being. Or negatively expressed we cannot think
of bodiless minds, of ghosts. Some people believe
in ghosts and imagine they can think bodiless minds
as realities. At any rate mind has to be thought, as
everything else, in mental symbols and we can define
it only in terms which denote mental or psychical
processes.
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Mr. Spencer in slightly altering these two truisms, ( i
)
that the idea of matter is a mental symbol and (2) that
the idea of mind must always be thought in connection
with material bodies, produces an ingenious antithesis
which hides a fallacy under the impression of profund-
ity. In this way he enters into a vicious circle out of
which he cannot escape. Finding himself hopelesly
caught in the trap which he set for himself, he declares
that there is no way out of it. This while conscious-
ness lasts renders impossible all knowledge of that ul-
timate reality in which subject and object are united.
Indeed, such fallacies make knowledge impossible.
But, then, what is the Ultimate Reality in which
subject and object are united? Why, there is no "ul-
timate" reality. Reality is either real or it is not real,
there are no degrees of a more or less ultimate reality.
Can there be anything realer than real ?
Reality is that which exists. This is a broad and
general statement, and from general statements you
cannot expect detailed explanations. If you wish to
know what characteristics reality possesses you must
study it in detail and that is exactly what our scien-
tists are doing. If you wish to know the nature of re-
ality go to science, study physics, chemistry, botany,
zoology, physiology, astronom)', and above all study
the propaedeutics of science, especially mathematics
and logic, the sciences of formal thought. All the re-
sults of these sciences are more or less actual knowl-
edge. No science represents the whole of reality; every
science investigates one side of nature only, it moves
in some one special kind of abstraction. None of them
represents in a special degree "the innermost nature "
of things, but all of them represent some real actual
qualities of nature, and in this sense we might say
that every one of them represents the innermost na-
ture of reality. That we know little in comparison to
what we wish to know, that in addition to some actual
knowledge we propose guesses called hypotheses, and
that, however much we shall know, the whole world of
reality is so immeasurable and its relations are so in-
finite that we shall never and can never know it out,
is a fact that nobody disputes. But no amount of ig-
norance (which by the bye is something negative only)
justifies Mr. Spencer's agnostic proposition that all
knowledge is rendered impossible.
Agnosticism in whatever form it may appear (with
the sole exception of the Agnosticism of Modesty which
means judgment suspended so long as sufficient evi-
dence is missing) is throughout the outcome of some
erroneous reasoning. The faults of a lens appear on the
picture in the camera, and if no other information can
be had, are indistinguishable from the objects pictured.
So agnosticism is the confusion of the thoughts of a
thinker taken by him to be the objective reality of the
world mirrored in his thoughts. p. C.
CURRENT TOPICS.
There is a story travelling round by the newspaper line, and
probably false, to the effect that the Pres'dent of the United
States is about to send an autograph letter of congratulation to the
German Emperor thanking him for admitting the American pig into
Germany. According to the story, a man-of-war ship will be spe-
cially appointed to carry the letter, thus giving it a sort of regal
and imperial dignity ; which it would not have if simply dropped
into the post office, or even entrusted to the American Minister at
Berlin. The President, say the newspapers, is anxious to thank
the Emperor, " for an act of such signal importance to the entire
West, and in particular to the great pork industries of Chicago."
And, a member of the cabinet, name not given, is quoted as say-
ing, "The elections West are near at hand, and the President
wishes to accentuate his success for the farming community in
practically opening the European markets to a great product."
The " man-of-war " part of it gives a brackish flavor to the story,
and makes it look like a yarn prepared exclusively for the marines.
Such a letter would be diplomatically dangerous, and it might pro-
voke the Emperor to write in reply, " Go thou and do likewise."
To thank the Germans for doing what we refuse to do, would be
to stultify ourselves for nothing. The President knows enough to
let well enough alone. We may congratulate whomsoever it may
concern that the Germans have opened their gates to our swine,
but for all that, we shall continue to maintain a jealous barrier
against the pigs and pork of Germany.
Vicarious atonement is no longer a theory, but a condition,
at least in the state of Maine. In that commonwealth the pro-
hibitory liquor law is vigorously enforced, and vigorously evaded.
It has lately been discovered that in some parts of that state men
can be hired for two dollars a day to expiate the sins of others, by
acting as dummy saloon keepers in those very dry neighborhoods
where the prohibitory law actually prohibits. The duty of a dummy
substitute is to stand at a window, and by touching an electric
button notify the real proprietor whether an approaching customer
is genuine or counterfeit, an orthodox disciple of St Bacchus, or
a spy. This duty requires that a dummy possess intuitive percep-
tions keen and true as those of a pointer dog It is also the duty
of the dummy, when the police make a raid on the saloon, to rep-
resent himself as the proprietor, and go to prison without grum-
bling, thus making a vacancy for another scapegoat, who will hold
the position until the old one returns from the wilderness, which
in this case means the jail. This kind of atonement is not unusual
in the world, but it is ruinously cheap when furnished for two
dollars a day ; although during the war, many a man died for his
country by means of a substitute costing less than five hundred
dollars. I once knew a soldier to falsely accuse himself of stealing
from the sutler, and take his punishment like a man, the real cul-
prit paying him for so doing a plug of tobacco down, and promis-
ing him five dollars in money " after pay day," a time indefinite
as the farmer's "after harvest." I regret to say that when pay
day came the latter part of the bargain was repudiated on the
ground that it was against good morals and contrary to public
policy. The expiator complained to me about it, but I could only
advise him never to expiate in future except for cash.
* *
We are a hero-worshipping people, but we like our heroes
dead ; for example General Grant. The statue of him was un-
veiled a few days ago in Chicago, and the ceremony of unveiling
it caused the most popular and populous demonstration ever seen in
the city. For hours, military and civic societies marched through
the streets in high procession on their way to offer incense to the
statue, while enthusiastic citizens rallied by swarms around the
monument to assist in the ceremony. Of this cheering multitude
of worshippers tens of thousands had censured General Grant in
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his lifetime as a man worthy of utter detestation, a corrupt magis-
trate, and a Ciesar meditating the overthrow of liberty. At the
unveiling ceremonies those very same unrelenting critics bowed
before his graven image in reverent adoration. Shall it become a
precept of American party spirit, that we speak nothing but good
of the dead, and nothing but evil of the living?
* *
Speaking of soldiers, and effigies, and images, reminds me of
this newspaper paragraph which I had nearly forgotten, "Skir-
mish shooting was the order of the day at Fort Sheridan yesterday.
The skirmish is a novel feature, in which a dozen scouts advance
towards dummy Indians and fire off hand. The scores were good,
two contestants making 130 points out of a possible zoo." This
kind of skirmish drill amounts to something ; it has a stimulus in
it almost equal to the taste of blood. There is a martial humor
about it which is nowhere to be found in the dull sport of shooting
at a blank target which even when you hit it, gives back no sug-
gestion of death nor portent of a broken bone. I agree that " the
scores were good"; 130 Indians for 200 shots appears to be ex-
tremely good ; but I account for the victory by this good luck that
the dummy Indians had no guns in their hands, and could not
fire back. I am confirmed in this opinion by the fact that in act-
ual fighting our soldiers never get 130 Indians out of a possible
200; although the Indians have been known to do much better
than that, and even to get 700 soldiers, out of a possible 700, a
record which has not been broken yet. Of course as a matter of
taste the drilling of soldiers to shoot at dummy Indians is open to
criticism ; and if we should hear that in Arizona or Dakota the In-
dians were shooting dummy soldiers by way of practice, we should
sadly say that it was a proof of their bloodthirsty disposition, and
the evidence would be conclusive ; it would prove them to be sav-
ages. The deplorable effects of such training on the mind was
made visible in that Clark Street tragedy when a dummy Indian
had his neck broken by a soldier from the fort. It appears that
the soldier being in town, "on pass," as they call it, came under
the inspiration of Chicago whiskey, a nectar which in its fine effect
upon the imagination has no equal in the world. Passing along
the street he saw a dummy Indian in front of a cigar store, and
the martial spirit of the soldier was immediately aroused. The
Indian, in a friendly way, offered the soldier a bunch of dummy
cigars, but the white brave thought it was a tomahawk, and im-
mediately attacked the Indian. He beat him severely about the
face, and then after a desperate wrestle flung him heavily to the
ground, the Indian's neck being broken in the fall. The soldier
was unreasonably fined for his conduct ; I say unreasonably, be-
cause the punishment ought to have been assessed against his com-
manding officer, who bad taught him to make war on dummy In-
dians at Fort Sheridan.
Field Marshal Von Moltke's Third Volume is just published
wherein he treats of 1870-71. What he says as a soldier is inter-
esting, but what he says as a statesman is not encouraging, for we
feel as if a cannon were talking to us, logical, passionless, and
stern. Our sentimental hope of peace through commerce, love,
charity, ethics, religion, and all the other gentle agencies vanishes
before this hard moralising of the old Field Marshal, "Only the
sword holds the sword in the scabbard." If this is true, then it
is only its sword and not its cause that gives a nation peace ; and
Shakespeare was wrong when he eaid, "Thrice is he armed who
hath his quarrel just"; for, according to Moltke, justice counts
for nothing in a quarrel between two nations. Unfortunately, in
this matter the soldier is wiser than the poet. The wars of old in
comparison to the modern wars were as a skirmish to a battle, for,
says Moltke, "Wars to- day draw the whole people to the battle
field—hardly a family without its sufferer. The future is almost
without hope if the following opinion is correct, " So long as na-
tions maintain separate lives there will be strife which can be set-
tled only with arms." Still more dreary is Moltke's prophecy of
relief, "It is to be hoped," he says, " that wars will become less
frequent in the degree in which they become more terrible." So,
that, until wars make the whole earth a desolation, and " the mul-
titudinous seas incarnadine," there will be no hope for interna-
tional harmony ; and gospels of peace and good will to men must
remain a mockery, and a conjurer's jingle of words.
M. M. Trumbull.
BOOK REVIEWS.
National LiBER.^L Club. Political Economy Circle. Transactions,
Vol. I. Edited by J. H. Levy, Honorary Secretary of the Cir-
cle. London ; P. S. King & Son. 1891.
The Political Economy Circle of the National Liberal Club, of
London, resembles in its essential features the Sunset Club of
Chicago. At certain times the members dine together ; and after
dinner, a paper is read on some economic subject by some com-
petent person, perhaps a member of the club, and perhaps not,
after which criticisms of the argument are in order. The papers
then are carefully edited, and published in book form. The Right
Hon. Charles Pelham Villiers, M. P., is President of the club.
The volume of "Transactions" before us contains six ad-
dresses, on the following subjects respectively: "The Economic
Principles Which Should Guide Legislation With Regard to the
Occupation of Land," by the Right Hon. Leonard H. Courtney,
M. P., Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons ; " International
Migration and Political Economy," by J. S. Mann, M. A., of Trin-
ity College, Oxford; "The Report of the Gold and Silver Com-
mission," by Alfred Milnes, M. A.; "The Rate of Interest," by
Sidney Webb, LL. B., Lecturer on Political Economy at the City
of London College ; "Distribution as a Branch of Economics," by
J. H. Levy, late Lecturer on Logic and Economics at the Birkbeck
Institution; "The Migration of Labor," by Hubert Llewellyn
Smith, B. A., Late Scholar of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.
The merit of papers like these is, that the writers of them, be-
ing limited in time by the rules of the club, are compelled to say
as much as possible in the fewest possible words. Books have
been written on these themes which do not contain as many ideas
and reasons as are condensed into these essays. They are all of
them of the highest quality both in matter and style. /i//r.
THE OPEN COURT.
PUBLISHED EVERY THURSDAY BY
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.
TERMS THROUGHOUT THE POSTAL UNION:
$2.00 PER YEAR. $1.00 FOR SIX MONTHS.
AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND TASMANIA, $2,50 PER YEAR
N. B. Binding Cases for single yearly volumes of The Open Court will
be supplied on order. Price 75 cents each.
All communications should be addressed to
(Nixon Building, 175 La Salle Street,)
P. O. DRAWER F. CHICAGO, ILL.
CONTENTS OF NO. 217.
HERBERT SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY. Dr. Lewis G. .
Janes 2991
THE CASE OF AGNOSTICISM REVISED. Editor.
. . . 2993
CURRENT TOPICS. Germany and American Pork. Vi-
carious Atonement. The Worship of Dead Heroes. The
Indian as a Target. Von Moltke on the Sword. Gen.
M. M. Trumbull 2997
BOOK REVIEWS 2998
